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THE “ACTUAL STATE OF THINGS”: 
TEACHING ABOUT LAW 
IN POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
DAVID E. WILKINS∗ 
 
Vine Deloria, Jr., the most prolific Native writer and one of the most 
gifted intellectuals in American history, left a deep imprint in many of the 
fields he so artfully plowed, including: education, religion, politics, cultural 
critic, history, and indigenous knowledge.  His scholarship on specific sub-
jects came in waves, with each wave building upon the previous one before 
reaching its remarkable crest. 
Deloria’s scholastic and pragmatic legacy in federal Indian law and 
policy and indigenous governance is one that has produced several major 
books1 and numerous articles,2 which, in the pantheon of Deloria’s prodi-
gious body of works, rank highly in terms of their quality, clarity, and im-
portance.  He has influenced a wide body of legal works including treaties, 
 
 ∗Professor of American Indian Studies, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Law, and 
American Studies, University of Minnesota; Ph.D., 1990, University of North Carolina/Chapel 
Hill.  I want to thank Matthew Fletcher for the invitation to participate in the conference and Kara 
Gansmann for her excellent editorial skills in getting my article in shape for publication.  
1. See, e.g., THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS (Vine Deloria, Jr. 
ed., Univ. of Okla. Press 2002); 1 & 2 VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, 
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY:  TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 
1775-1979 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1999) [hereinafter 1 & 2 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS 
OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY]; VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, 
TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (Univ. of Tex. Press 1999); VINE DELORIA, JR., 
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Univ. of Okla. Press 1985); THE 
AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S (Vine Deloria, Jr. & 
Sandra L. Cadwalader eds., Temple Univ. Press 1984); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. 
LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
(Pantheon Books 1984); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, 
AMERICAN JUSTICE (Univ. of Tex. Press 1983). 
2. See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., The Application of the Constitution to American Indians, in  
EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 281-315 (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds., Clear Light 
Publishers 2002); Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the 
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 203-23 (1989) [hereinafter 
Deloria, Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity]; Vine Deloria, Jr., Beyond the Pale: American 
Indians and the Constitution, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 249-268 (Jules Lobel ed., Monthly Review Press 1988); VINE DELORIA, 
JR., AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 239-256 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 
Univ. of Okla. Press 1985); Vine Deloria, Jr., The Distinctive Status of Indian Rights, in  THE 
PLAINS INDIANS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 237-48 (Peter Iverson ed., 2d prtg. 1985); VINE 
DELORIA, JR., THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S 
105-30 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., Temple Univ. Press 1984); Vine Deloria, 
Jr., Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 Edition, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 121, 
121-42 (1982) (book review).  
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international law, and legal analysis as a whole.  Deloria’s scholarship 
provides crisp analysis of the convoluted political and legal dimensions of 
indigenous status, while simultaneously exploring the intergovernmental 
relationship of tribal nations and their status as original sovereign 
governments of the Americas. 
Deloria received formal academic training in general science (B.S. 
1958), theology (L.L.B. 1963), and law (J.D. 1972).  As anyone familiar 
with his work knows, he fluidly employed elements of each of these intel-
lectual frameworks and methodologies along with his own self-education in 
numerous other fields throughout the rest of his days.  For purposes of this 
essay, however, I want to focus on his understanding of how the law is 
taught, how it should be taught, and how his profound influence affects the 
way I teach my courses in indigenous politics and governance and the U.S. 
Supreme Court.3 
Deloria opted not to consistently practice law,4 but instead he liberally 
critiqued legal decisions, reviewed popular federal Indian law casebooks, 
and taught a number of courses at the University of Arizona and later the 
University of Colorado at Boulder in the departments of History and 
Political Science.  In addition, at various times, he taught in the law schools 
of both institutions as well.  When I entered the special M.A. degree 
program in 1980, a terminal Master’s degree called American Indian Policy 
Studies that Deloria had created in the political science department at the 
University of Arizona in 1979, I quickly discovered that Deloria had 
designed a curriculum that was equal parts politics, policy, law, and history.  
He emphasized in each of the classes I had with him that in order to 
understand the contemporary status of indigenous nations, students needed 
a deep, unvarnished, and unrelenting exposure and immersion in each of 
these four fields.  Furthermore, Deloria placed special importance on 
history, along with a liberal dose of geography, education, anthropology, 
and economics.  The justification for this unique program under the rubric 
of political science, as opposed to law, was outlined by Deloria in the 
department’s graduate student handbook in 1981: 
 
3. Of course, as a student of Deloria’s in the early 1980s, and as one who maintained a 
relationship with him throughout the years, his influence, in fact, colors all the courses that I 
teach, whether in United States or American Indian politics, federal Indian policy, comparative 
indigenous peoples, tribal government, minority peoples, etc. 
4. Deloria was a vital expert witness during the trials that followed the American Indian 
Movement’s takeover of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1973.  E.g., United States v. Banks, 
Unites States v. Means, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974).  He was also a plaintiff in the trademark 
case against the Washington Redskin’s football team, Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 
2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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Political Science offers the most comprehensive context in which 
federal Indian policy can be explored and understood.  No law 
school in the United States has more than one or two courses in the 
field of Indian law.  Most of these courses are experimental or deal 
with complex issues in a generalized survey that cannot possibly 
deal adequately with the history and development of the major 
concepts now defining and influencing the field of Indian Affairs.  
Political Science combines the insights and knowledge of history, 
law, political philosophy, and comparative systems and thus en-
ables the student to understand the complexity of issues by using a 
wide and significant variety of tools for analysis.  Tribal govern-
ments have traditionally called upon the professional anthro-
pologist, sociologist, educator, and economist for their informa-
tion, forgetting that the basic relationship of their governments and 
programs to the federal government is a political relationship 
formed historically according to certain basic interpretations of 
the nature of society and government.  Political Science deals 
precisely with these topics and thus presents the most compre-
hensive and intelligible context for discussing both problems and 
solutions.5 
Deloria stressed that a new kind of academic was being groomed via this 
unique program: the Policy Specialist.  Those who successfully finished the 
two-year program, Deloria argued, would be well trained to navigate 
multiple academic fields and would therefore become useful employees of 
tribal governments or other governments or organizations.  This new 
“Policy Specialist” would be capable of conducting such tasks as preparing 
reports for land disputes, solving boundary problems, resolving fishing 
rights controversies, interpreting treaty rights, and developing tribal sover-
eignty concepts and programs, among other topics. 
The curriculum included many courses, but the crux of the program 
was a two-semester core course, Politics 484a-484b titled “Development of 
Federal Indian Policy,” which was required of all students.  This two-part 
course’s principal purpose was to “provide a chronological framework and 
theoretical context in which policies, programs, and events can be seen 
interacting with each other to produce the cumulative body of treaties, 
statutes, and court decisions which define the present configuration of the 
 
5. DEP’T OF POLITICAL SCI., UNIV. OF ARIZ., GRADUATE STUDENT’S HANDBOOK 27 (1981) 
(unpublished, copy on file with author) (emphasis added). 
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federal-Indian relationship.”6  Additionally, the two sequential courses also 
functioned to provide a setting: 
[I]n which the role, task, and scope of capability of the Policy 
Specialist is explored; to give students a fundamental knowledge 
of federal Indian policy as it has developed historically and 
conceptually; to demonstrate the variety of research sources which 
policy questions require; and to encourage the student to construct 
models in which policies can be studied and evaluated.7 
The first semester of the course focused on the origin and development 
of the various legal, political, and philosophical concepts that overarch and 
underlay the policies developed first by the competing European colonial 
powers and later developed by the United States to the year 1871–the year 
Congress enacted the treaty termination measure.  Concepts such as the 
“doctrine of discovery, papal authority, the trust doctrine, [and] the role of 
federalism,” were critiqued and analyzed.  The second semester addressed 
the policies, laws, and political machinations of the federal and state 
governments from 1871 to the present time, with an emphasis on the post-
World War II period. 
Besides this important pair of courses, Deloria and the other faculty he 
helped assemble8 taught a bevy of seminars, many of which he created, that 
dealt with specific topics of historical and contemporary importance to 
tribal nations.  Some course titles included: “Congress and the American 
Indian,” “Indian Educational Policies,” “American Indians & the Supreme 
Court,” “Tribal Governments, Indians and the Judicial Process,” “Indian 
Water Rights,” “Indian Claims,” and the course that left the deepest 
impression on me, “Indian Treaties.” 
The Treaties course critically examined the historical, political, cul-
tural, and legal evolution of these vital documents from pre-colonial times 
to the present.  And while Indian treaties constituted the core of the course, 
what I obtained from the course was so much more than just the documents 
themselves.  It was an intense, comprehensive, yet historically and legally 
detailed course that was by far the most intellectually challenging and 
emotionally demanding course I had ever had, or would ever have, 
including my Ph.D. years in political science at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 
6. Id. at 29. 
7. Id. 
8. Among the faculty he recruited for the program were historian Thomas Holm (Cherokee-
Creek) and Robert K. Thomas (Cherokee), a well known anthropologist.  Professor Clifford Lytle, 
a specialist in constitutional law and American institutions, was already well entrenched in the 
department.  He and Deloria would later author several books together. 
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For Deloria, history, culture, philosophy, and politics created the broad 
canvas on which the various diplomatic and treaty arrangements between 
indigenous nations and foreign powers, including the United States, were 
developed.  For Deloria, it was this diverse body of diplomatic accords, 
rooted in the political, not legal, concept of “consent,” that formed the 
exquisite intergovernmental, intercultural, and interracial relations tapestry 
that make the study of Native politics and law so fascinating.9  Thus, the 
Treaties seminar entailed a comprehensive assessment of the history of 
treaty-making, from traditional practices between tribal nations to colonial 
arrangements between European powers (e.g., France, Spain, and England) 
and tribal peoples, to Revolutionary War treaties, early state treaties, 
Removal treaties, Western trade treaties, Civil War treaties, Peace 
Commission documents, the “end” of treaty making in 1871,10 railroad 
agreements, General Allotment agreements, Claims Commission adjust-
ments, and many negotiated settlements of the 1970s to the present. 
After conducting a sweeping introduction of the substantial body of 
unique treaties, the course then focused on specific treaty concepts.  For 
example concepts included: the nature and grounds of obligation; the power 
to make treaties; the duration, suspension, and termination of treaties; 
conflicts between treaties; constitutions; laws and ordinances; modification; 
abrogation; and the dissolution of treaties.  Within this context, faculty 
lectures were structured around how these issues had been addressed in case 
law.  Given this base, lectures centered on an assessment of special doc-
trines, including the status of treaties, the construction and interpretation of 
treaty language, the rights created by treaties, and congressional powers and 
limitations. 
As a class, my fellow students and I next read a wide cross section of 
law review articles that examined specific treaties or treaty concepts.  And 
then we moved into a case study phase that critically examined several 
tribes and specific treaty arrangements in detail.  Case studies included: the 
Northern Paiute of Central Oregon, the Treaty of Fort Laramie, and the 
fishing rights of tribes of the Northwest.  Once the case study phase was 
complete, we then engaged in a comparative examination of key treaty pro-
visions involving fishing rights, educational provisions, and jurisdictional 
 
9. Deloria, Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity, supra note 2, at 219. 
10. Deloria, among others, has long argued that treaty-making did not, in fact, end in 1871, 
but rather was a transformed process.  See generally 1 & 2 DELORIA & DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS 
OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY, supra note 1 (containing several chapters, most notably 
chapter 6 in volume 1, in which they convincingly argue that the diplomatic process, while altered 
after 1871, still constituted ongoing political negotiations that entail diplomacy). 
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clauses.  Finally, we read several essays that addressed treaties from a 
literary and cultural perspective. 
By the time the course was over, we knew that we had received a 
thorough grounding in the distinctive diplomatic—political and moral—
relationship between tribal nations and the other polities the tribes dealt 
with and continue to engage.  Unlike the manner in which many federal 
Indian law classes are currently taught in law schools, the federal and state 
case law that we read was used largely to supplement the broad intergov-
ernmental relationship that formed the conceptual and historical parameters 
of the course as Deloria had constructed it.  This is critical because it con-
firms the extra-constitutional status of indigenous nations as the original 
sovereigns of the Americas and does not treat tribal nations as merely one 
of several ethnic groups. 
As Deloria noted in another essay critiquing the current content and 
pedagogy of federal Indian law, 
[T]he argument is that if history and treaties are sufficient to 
identify these groups as deserving special attention, why curtail the 
process–why shouldn’t federal Indian law be severely restricted to 
a set of general doctrines based on treaty law and statutes univer-
sally applicable to all Indian nations representing deliberate efforts 
of Congress to fulfill its trust and/or protectorate responsibilities?  
After this section of articulating doctrines of universal applica-
bility, substantial space can be allocated for the respective Indian 
nations and their history.  There are some federal statutes that have 
a general applicability–the General Allotment Act, the Removal 
Act, the Indian Reorganization Act, and the Indian Civil Rights 
Act.  But even within these general laws, numerous exceptions 
exist that are created by the separate histories of the respective 
tribes.  As long as we emphasize the generalities, we do violence 
to the rights of Indians as they are articulated specifically in the 
history of the tribe with the federal government.11 
With this important intellectual and scholarly foundation, by the time I 
joined the academy and began offering my own courses, I had begun to 
develop (and I continue to add to this list) a set of overarching maxims that 
helped me to better understand the distinctive internal political/legal status 
of tribal nations and their external intergovernmental and intercultural 
relationships with other polities.  These maxims are largely a result of 
 
11. Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 969 (1996). 
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Deloria’s influence, but also because of my own training in political science 
and tribal political and legal histories.  I begin many of my courses by 
setting at least some of these maxims before the students, and then I ask 
them to consider these as we move through the historical, legal, and 
political materials to be analyzed.  The list, at the present time, includes the 
following: 
As the preexisting sovereigns of the Americas, indigenous nations 
are, by definition, nations and have and maintain a pre-constitu-
tional and extra-constitutional status that fundamentally separates 
and distinguishes them from all other groups in the United States. 
Historical data and the political arrangements (i.e., treaties, 
agreements, negotiated settlements, etc.) that emerged during 
cross-cultural encounters should and must be determinative of 
subordinate legal concepts and doctrines, and not the other way 
around. 
Political science, history, anthropology, psychology, economics, 
and geography, among other fields, provide “critical” perspectives 
to Indian policy and intergovernmental relations that law typically 
appears unable or unwilling to provide. 
The diplomatic record between tribal nations and the other politi-
cal entities confirms the sovereign (separate) status of tribes; while 
the trust relationship confirms the politically connected status of 
tribal nations to the federal government. 
Federal law, including Federal Indian law, is typically presumed to 
be rational, uniform, and fair, while the historical record bears out 
that it actually operates largely on the basis of political and econo-
mic expediency and depends largely on the personalities of key 
policy-making individuals. 
Federal Indian law is presumed to be generalizable to all federally-
recognized tribes; but there are profound exceptions that make 
such a presumption unrealistic, given the historic and political fact 
that most tribes engaged in diplomacy on a nation-to-nation rela-
tionship with the United States and other political powers. There 
are many examples where congressional statutes, federal regula-
tions, and supreme court decisions are drafted in a way that they 
apply to single tribal nations. 
American Indian law or Federal Indian law is sometimes described 
as: either the pre-contact organic or traditional laws and customs 
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of tribes; the laws developed by European powers and later the 
United States that directly or indirectly affect Indian nations; the 
ongoing legal outputs of tribal policy-makers; or some amalgam of 
all the above.  We must be clear on how we are using the term in a 
particular class because when we speak of American Indian law or 
the “rule of law,” we must be aware of whose rules and whose 
laws are being invoked. 
The federal government’s various branches say they support the 
concept of tribal sovereignty while simultaneously maintaining 
that the U.S. can exercise plenary (virtually absolute) power over 
those same sovereign tribal nations. 
Along with these maxims, I have also over the years developed a set of 
questions, again, largely influenced by Deloria, but were also derived from 
my own reading and analysis of the historical, political, and legal data 
pertaining to Native Nations.  Many of these queries spawn from the max-
ims described above.  The questions, at the moment, include the following: 
Since tribal nations are sovereign governments and had no part in 
the formation of the U.S. Constitution, and have never formally 
been incorporated via the amendment process, absent express 
tribal consent or specific statutory language, how can general acts 
of Congress be made applicable to tribal nations? 
Since tribal nations have a nation-to-nation or government-to-
government relationship with the U.S., based in diplomacy, why 
are Supreme Court decisions, like Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,12 
involving a specific tribal nation, considered binding precedent on 
all other tribal nations? 
Since the Constitution under the Commerce Clause expressly 
reserves to the Congress the power to regulate trade with tribal 
nations, why are state governments, without tribal consent, in-
creasingly getting involved in internal tribal affairs?  Can Congress 
devolve its constitutional authority for Indian affairs to states 
absent tribal consent and without the accompanying treaty and 
trust responsibilities attached? 
How can the concept of congressional plenary power (defined as 
virtually absolute power) over tribal nations coexist in the U.S., 
which fashions itself as a democratic state?  Democracy, by 
definition, implies limited, not unlimited, power.  This is further 
 
12. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
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complicated by the fact that individual citizens of tribal nations 
have been declared citizens of the U.S. and the state they reside in. 
Depending on the course I am teaching, once I have discussed these 
maxims and a number of these questions, I then move to the subject matter 
of the particular course: American Indian Tribal Government and Politics; 
Indigenous Peoples: A Global Perspective; Federal Indian Policy; American 
Indian law; American Indian Sovereignty, Law, & Treaty Rights; Tribal 
Political Economy; American Indian Diplomacy; or others.  For purposes of 
this essay, I will narrow my discussion to how I have constructed and teach 
a course entitled “American Indians and the Supreme Court.”  This is a 
course that I inherited from Deloria, but one that I significantly modified 
given my background in political science. 
Before discussing how I teach this course, I must also say that in vir-
tually every course I teach, I include a brief but important couple of classes 
defining the six major concepts that overarch and suffuse Federal Indian 
policy and law.  These concepts include: treaties, the trust doctrine, plenary 
power, the discovery doctrine, federalism, and sovereignty (including the 
“tribal” variant of that key term).  Each of these terms is critical and, with 
the exception of federalism, does not generally apply to any other 
racial/ethnic/gender group in the continental United States.  Each of these 
terms, I inform my students, must be fully interrogated both from  indige-
nous and non-indigenous perspectives and they must be placed in historical, 
social, cultural, political, and legal context to see how and why they arose 
when they did and how and why they have been defined across time and in 
various intergovernmental situations. 
In “American Indians and the Supreme Court,” which is a senior level 
course, I stress in my syllabus that the decisions of the court have had and 
continue to have a profound effect on the status and rights of tribal nations 
and have deeply influenced the contours of the tribal/federal/state relation-
ship, despite the fact that tribal nations still exist in an extra-constitutional 
position vis-à-vis the United States government.  The purpose of the course, 
broadly put, is to explore the following question: what is the role and what 
has been the practice of the Supreme Court as a policy-making institution 
when dealing with indigenous nations and their citizens, who also happen to 
enjoy status as U.S. citizens?  This broad inquiry requires the students and I 
to think both historically and theoretically, to ask about the origins and 
exercise of federal judicial power, and to examine the application of federal 
law to indigenous peoples and Indian citizens in various areas of law. 
I stress to the students that we will be using several methods of analysis 
–theoretical, behavioral, institutional, and case study.  The course is divided 
into several major sections.  First, we begin by creating a philosophical and 
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theoretical framework through which to judge both the role of the Court and 
Indian law decisions.  Second, we then briefly look at indigenous legal and 
political traditions13 and assess how these influenced and were in turn influ-
enced by western legal traditions.  Third, we then turn to an examination of 
the Supreme Court as a political and policy-making institution.  This is 
most important to establish because while the Court is certainly a legal 
entity and writes law, it is first and most fundamentally a profoundly politi-
cal institution and crafts important policy pronouncements, otherwise 
known as judicial opinions, as one of three co-equal branches of govern-
ment.  Furthermore, the court reeks of politics because the matter of who is 
or is not appointed to the court is political.  Certainly, how the judicial 
nominees traverse the appointment process is political, and how the justices 
negotiate as they are drafting their opinions is also an intensely political 
process. 
Fourth, we then assess the various theories which purport to explain the 
inter-institutional role of the Court and the Court’s role in national policy-
making.  Much of the discussion revolves around how the Court interacts 
vis-à-vis with the other branches of government, as well as the question of 
whether the Court is primarily supposed to be deferential to the political 
branches or whether it is authorized by the Constitution with the power to 
initiate policies if the other branches fail to act.  Another major question is 
whether the Court is supposed to primarily confer legitimacy on the laws 
and policies pronounced by the so-called political branches—the Congress 
and the President—or does the Court have the inherent authority to act 
largely unchecked and craft policy because the justices are life-tenured and 
have wide discretionary authority over which cases to decide. 
Fifth, we also spend time reading about and discussing a seminal 
question: Whether or not indigenous nations are, in fact, an integral part of 
 
13. Since I am not a law professor, although I have an Adjunct Appointment at the law 
school at the University of Minnesota, I have only taught the American Indian law course there 
once, after Phillip Frickey’s departure.  But if I were to teach it consistently, I would emphasize, 
as Deloria did in much of his work, that if we are to do the subject matter right, and in order to 
accord tribal nations the respect their national status entitles them to, that the course currently 
titled “federal (or American) Indian law” at most law schools should be redirected and restruc-
tured to present an indigenous oriented body of knowledge that recognizes the preexisting systems 
of law and governance already in place within tribes long before Europeans arrived and that also 
recognizes the active status of tribal nations even after sustained contact with those foreign bodies.  
Such a course would emphasize the retained internal sovereign powers of tribal nations in relation 
to domestic law, their external sovereign powers as established under ratified treaty law, and the 
unique natural resource and property rights that tribal governments retain.  The course would also 
emphasize how the natural resources are recognized and sometimes exploited under tribal, federal, 
and state law.  This structural and pedagogical arrangement for the course was elaborated on by 
Deloria.  See Deloria, Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, supra 
note 11, at 969 (emphasizing a pedagogical rearrangement of Indian law courses). 
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the United States Constitution’s framework?  In other words, do tribal 
nations remain extra-constitutional entities, or have they become constitu-
tionally-recognized over the years?  Or, do they, in fact, enjoy both 
statuses?  Finally, after having established the historical, theoretical, 
philosophical, and political context, we then read and analyze dozens of 
Supreme Court decisions that have left the deepest mark on indigenous 
rights and sovereignty.  The following subfields are included within the dis-
cussion: indigenous status and federal relations; aboriginal land title and 
Indian Country; criminal and civil jurisdiction; taxation and regulatory 
jurisdiction; water rights; hunting and fishing rights; claims case appeals;  
and individual Indian rights, including citizenship, preference, and religion. 
Course requirements for undergraduates include two in-class essay 
exams that typically deal with doctrines of law; policy interpretations of the 
court’s decisions; or the intergovernmental relationship between tribes, the 
states, and the federal government.  I assign two major writing assignments 
for undergraduates and three for graduates or law students.  The first paper 
that all students are required to write is a critical analysis of a major 
Supreme Court decision involving aboriginal issues.  The students are ex-
pected to craft a legal/political history of the case in which they detail who 
the parties (litigants, lawyers, interest groups) were, what the fact situation 
was, a description of the political and historical context, and finally, the 
role, if any, of the federal government. 
The second paper topic for the students varies.  Sometimes I ask them 
to select a Supreme Court justice and do a biographical treatment.  Other 
times I ask them to select a specific treaty and do an analysis of that 
document, specifically addressing how its provisions have been dealt with 
by the court.  At other times, I create a fact situation involving Indian issues 
and ask the students to write a decision as if they were a justice.  Graduate 
and law students are expected to write a third paper that is a Shepard’s 
citation analysis of a major Indian law decision. 
Other requirements include a set of weekly essay questions based on 
the week’s reading in which the students are expected to put themselves in 
the role of an instructor and ask questions based on the materials read.  
Finally, each student is expected to be the lead discussant and to write short 
political/legal briefs concerning several assigned articles, book chapters, 
and court opinions. 
The students over the years have found “American Indians and the 
Supreme Court” to be the most challenging of the courses I teach because it 
demands a great deal of their time and energy, and requires them to ap-
proach the Supreme Court with an open mind.  More importantly, the more 
astute students find that by having to examine the Court’s policy outputs—
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its judicial opinions—from the various disciplinary perspectives that I use, 
and by intensely examining who the justices are and the internal logic of 
their reasoning, methodology, and sometimes selective use of precedent and 
history, that this challenges their basic notions of the alleged fairness and 
impartiality of the law and of the meaning of democracy itself.  The stu-
dents come to see that the Court is, indeed, a richly political entity and that 
history, personality, economics, and culture matters and have an effect on 
many of the “opinions” issued by the Court’s justices. 
Robert Dahl, a prominent political scientist writing in the 1950s, 
summarized this last issue best when he astutely said of the Court: 
To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a 
legal institution is to underestimate its significance in the 
American political system.  For it is also a political institution, an 
institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on controversial 
questions of national policy.  As a political institution, the Court is 
highly unusual, not least because Americans are not quite willing 
to accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite 
capable of denying it; so that frequently we take both positions at 
once.  This is confusing to foreigners, amusing to logicians, and 
rewarding to ordinary Americans who thus manage to retain the 
best of both worlds.14 
If we are serious about understanding and then imparting knowledge about 
the distinctive status of indigenous nations’ rights, then we should first 
ground ourselves and our students in the “actual” facts of history.  We 
should then ground Native rights in treaty law, and we should always 
understand that politics, economics, and culture matters play a determi-
native role in the evolution or regression of the dynamic political/legal 
relationship between tribal nations and the latter-day governments that 
formed on tribal lands. 
 
 
14. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker Policy Making in a Democracy:  The Role of the United States Supreme Court, 6 J. 
PUB. L. 279 (1957) (emphasis in original). 
